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2	UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
3	SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
4	Case No. 10-12280-alg
5	x
6	In the Matter of:
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8	2300 XTRA WHOLESALERS, INC.,
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10	Debtor.
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12	x
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14	U.S. Bankruptcy Court
15	One Bowling Green
16	New York, New York
17	
18	August 5, 2010
19	2:49 PM
20	
21	BEFORE:
22	HON. ALLAN L. GROPPER
23	U.S. BANKRUPTCY JUDGE
24	
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Page 2 Initial Case Conference Amended Motion Filed by Condal Distributors, Inc. and Condal Imports, Inc. for an Order Granting Relief from the Automatic Stay Opposition Filed by Debtor to Amended Motion by Condal Distributors, Inc. and Condal Imports, Inc. for an Order Terminating the Automatic Stay and Related Relief Transcribed by: Dena Page

Page 3 1 APPEARANCES: 2 GOLDBERG WEPRIN FINKEL GOLDSTEIN LLP 3 Attorneys for Debtor 1501 Broadway 5 New York, NY 10036 6 7 BY: NEAL M. ROSENBLOOM, ESQ. 8 9 10 LAW OFFICES OF JOSEPH A. ALTMAN, P.C. Attorneys for Condal Distributors and Condal Imports 11 951 Bruckner Boulevard 12 13 1st Floor Bronx, NY 10459 14 15 16 BY: JOSEPH A. ALTMAN, ESQ. 17 18 HOFFMAN POLLAND & FURMAN, PLLC 19 20 Attorneys for Bogopa 21 220 East 42nd Street 22 Suite 435 23 New York, NY 10017 24 25 BY: JONATHAN S. HOFFMAN, ESQ.

Page 4 PROCEEDINGS 1 2 THE COURT: All right, 2300 XTRA. May I have appearances? 3 MR. ROSENBLOOM: Neal M. Rosenbloom, Goldberg Weprin Finkel Goldstein, attorneys for the debtors. 5 6 MR. ALTMAN: On behalf of Condal, Joseph A. Altman. THE COURT: All right, one of the --7 MR. ROSENBLOOM: Your Honor --9 THE COURT: -- purposes of this hearing was for me to issue a decision on the pending motions of the landlord. 10 11 me just ask you before proceeding to that, are there any developments that the parties wish to bring to my attention. 12 13 have the correspondence relating to the alleged changing of keys and Mr. Rosenbloom's letter and the response from the 14 15 landlord that basically the allegations are in error, as my 16 client has confirmed that it never changed the locks after the debtor obtained possession. So I don't know that it matters, 17 18 but that's where the landlord says things stand, as I 19 understand it, Mr. Altman. 20 MR. ALTMAN: That is correct, Your Honor. 21 THE COURT: All right. 22 MR. ROSENBLOOM: Your Honor, by way of developments, 23 after the hearing on the 21st, we communicated with counsel for the landlord, provided them with numerous dates when we would 24 25 be available to meet that next week to try to reach some kind

of a reconciliation or accord. We were advised by counsel that the landlord had no interest in meeting with us whatsoever under any circumstances.

We also, Your Honor -- as I had advised Your Honor previously, we had entered into a contract with Bogopa Service Corp. to buy the debtor's assets and to obtain an assignment of the lease in consideration of the sum of two and a half million dollars. To my left is Jonathan Hoffman who is a partner with Hoffman Polland & Furman, counsel for Bogopa. They have provided us with Bogopa's audited financial statement for the year ending December 31, 2009. We're prepared to share that with counsel under, of course, a confidentiality agreement.

Bogopa is a privately-held corporation. It consists of, among other things, seventeen supermarkets and --

THE COURT: Well, we don't get there until I decide the current motions.

MR. ROSENBLOOM: That's --

THE COURT: So perhaps I need to do that first, and then we can -- if I don't grant them, then we can take up -- I gather you want to move to assume and assign the lease --

MR. ROSENBLOOM: Correct, Your Honor, and --

THE COURT: -- as well as the personalty, but personalty, perhaps, may be less important than the lease, than the assumption and assignment of the lease.

MR. ROSENBLOOM: Clearly. And we have -- in

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accordance with Your Honor's instructions, we did notice up a proposed sale, which we did not make subject to higher and better bids because the purchase price is more than sufficient to pay all creditors in full. We've obtained a date for that hearing, which is the 31st of August. We also brought on a separate motion for prophylactic purposes to extend the time to assume or reject the lease, and that motion is returnable, I believe, the 19th. We were advised that Your Honor's going to be away, I believe, the week of the 23rd, so we could not --THE COURT: Well, we don't get to any of them --MR. ROSENBLOOM: We don't get to any of that unless --THE COURT: -- if I grant the landlord's motions. So why don't we -- shall we proceed to that? I gather there are no developments at all on the landlord/tenant front. As I understand it, the removal proceedings are in a procedural morass. Somewhere in the district court, before a district judge or before a magistrate, and with briefing extending into the next millennium, or at least until the end of the month. MR. ROSENBLOOM: Correct. THE COURT: That certainly doesn't clarify things, at least as far as I'm concerned. MR. ROSENBLOOM: Correct, Your Honor. There was an order that was signed by Judge --THE COURT: Gardephe.

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Page 7 MR. ROSENBLOOM: Right. Your Honor saw that order? 1 2. THE COURT: I saw that order, yes. MR. ROSENBLOOM: Fine. 3 THE COURT: As I understood the procedures, motions to 4 remand are supposed to be -- where the bankruptcy is in the 5 6 Southern District of New York, motions are supposed to be automatically referred to the bankruptcy court for at least 7 immediate disposition. It can be appealed to the district 9 court. The statute, of course, says district court has jurisdiction. Statute says district court has jurisdiction 10 11 over everything. On the other hand, it's not always done, and it's up to the district court to handle its own docket, and I'm 12 13 certainly going to be the last person to tell the district court what to do. I've already stated that I believe that that 14 case was improvidently removed. But so be it. 15 16 complicates things, as I think you'll understand, if I get to 17 my decision. Why don't I get to my decision? 18 MR. ROSENBLOOM: Does Your Honor want to hear anything 19 further from the parties on this matter? 20 THE COURT: Go ahead. Any -- in terms of argument? MR. ROSENBLOOM: Yes. 21 22 THE COURT: No. I've -- the parties have briefed the 23 issues. Unless there's anything further you wish to bring to my attention. Mr. Altman reargued the matter in his remand 24 25 papers, and I read those as well. And you certainly argued the

Page 8 matter, Mr. Rosenbloom. I think I understand the issues. At 1 2 least I hope I understand the issues, and if I haven't, there are at least three levels of appeal to tell me where I've erred. 4 MR. ALTMAN: I did -- well --5 6 THE COURT: Yes, sir? MR. ALTMAN: Just to note for the record that I did 7 not receive the July, nor the August payment. When I spoke to 8 9 counsel, I indicated to him that my client was just waiting for the Court's decision, and that the July payment was due and 10 11 then with respect to the August one, as well. THE COURT: Mr. Rosenbloom? 12 13 MR. ROSENBLOOM: When we were last here, Your Honor --THE COURT: This is -- bankruptcy is not an option. 14 MR. ROSENBLOOM: No, no, no. I have the check. 15 16 THE COURT: Hand it over. 17 MR. ROSENBLOOM: We were supposed to tender this when we met, Your Honor. I do have the check. 18 19 THE COURT: Hand it over. All right. 20 July? 21 MR. ROSENBLOOM: Yes, sir. 22 THE COURT: Or July and August? 23 MR. ALTMAN: Just July. MR. ROSENBLOOM: No, that is July, Your Honor. 24 25 THE COURT: Well, August -- we're past August -- I

Page 9 1 assume this lease, like every other lease, provides for payment 2. in advance. 3 MR. ROSENBLOOM: On the 1st, with a ten-day grace --THE COURT: On the 1st of the month. 4 MR. ROSENBLOOM: -- with a ten-day grace period. 5 6 THE COURT: All right, I suppose if you are going to be evicted forthwith after my decision, there might be some 7 reluctance to pay the rent. 9 As I assume the parties may know, there's a lot of very expensive litigation out there on the question of stub 10 11 rent and liability for stub rent under 365(d)(3). I wrote an opinion giving my views on that issue and hoping it would be 12 13 appealed so that we'd get a decision from the Second Circuit, and parties wouldn't have to fight over it, at least in this 14 circuit. But, alas, no one appealed. Everyone settled the 15 16 issue. So that's unknown. So we'll leave the August rent aside for the moment. 17 Certainly, if there are any further proceedings later in the 18 19 month, I'll expect the August month rent to be paid. 20 MR. ROSENBLOOM: Clearly. THE COURT: Anything further? 21 22 MR. ROSENBLOOM: I just wanted to point out to the 23 Court that our client relies, of course, on the provisions of 749 of the Real Property Actions and Proceedings law. 24 25 THE COURT: I didn't bring it up, but yes, I have my

volume of it downstairs. Brings back memories of many years ago when I went into landlord/tenant court, too.

MR. ROSENBLOOM: And I believe, Your Honor, that that statute really does not distinguish, whatsoever, as between the termination of holdover proceedings or nonpayment proceedings.

THE COURT: Well, now, that's been argued before.

Parties have arg -- I understand the argument.

Anything further?

All right, let me get to my decision.

voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code on April 29, 2010. Condal Distributors, Inc.
and Condal Imports, Inc., collectively, the landlord, the
owners of a single-story commercial building located at 2300
Randall Avenue, Bronx, New York (the premises) move for an
order determining that under Bankruptcy Code Section
362(b)(10), the automatic stay does not apply to the debtor's
real property lease of the premises (the lease), or in the
alternative, for an order modifying the automatic stay pursuant
to Bankruptcy Code Section 362(d)(1) and (2) to permit the
landlord to exercise his state law remedies with respect to the
lease and evict the tenant.

Background. The landlord and debtor entered into the lease in April 1992. During February 2008, it appears the debtor attempted to sublet and/or assign the lease to O.J.

Resources, Inc. (O.J. Resources). When the landlord objected to the subletting and/or assignment, the debtor commenced a New York State Court proceeding against the landlord seeking a declaration that the debtor could sublet and/or assign the lease (proceeding 1). The Supreme Court, County of Bronx denied the debtor's application seeking a declaration that it could assign or sublet. The landlord alleges the debtor, notwithstanding the terms of the lease and in contravention of the New York Supreme Court's ruling, turned over possession and management of the premises to O.J. Resources pursuant to the terms of a written agreement. In addition, the debtor allegedly defaulted under various other terms and provisions of the lease.

On May 23, 2008, the landlord served upon the debtor a five-day notice of default based on alleged monetary and nonmonetary defaults under the lease. In response, the debtor commenced a so-called Yellowstone action against the landlord in New York Supreme Court on or about May 31, 2008.

On February 24, 2009, the parties entered into a settlement agreement in connection with the Yellowstone proceeding. The settlement required the debtor to, one, evict O.J. Resources from the premises, two, obtain a certificate of occupancy for the intended use of the premises, three, pay rent when due, and four, cure other defaults under the lease. In addition, as part of the settlement, the debtor agreed to

discontinue proceeding 1 with prejudice.

Subsequent to the settlement's execution, O.J.

Resources was evicted from the premises, but the debtor allegedly defaulted under other terms of the lease and the settlement, including failure to pay rent when due. The landlord served a ten-day notice of termination under which the landlord claims the lease terminated on September 10, 2009.

The debtor refused to vacate the premises and on September 11, 2009, the landlord commenced a holdover proceeding in civil court against the debtor.

On April 26, 2010, a trial on the merits was held before Judge Arthur F. Engoron in the civil court of the City of New York. After trial, Judge Engoron rendered an oral decision on the record and issued a final judgment of possession and monetary damages in the amount of 238,329 dollars against the debtor on April 26, 2010.

The landlord purported to serve notice of entry on the debtor on May 1, 2010, but this was several days after the debtor had filed its Chapter 11 petition. The landlord did not and has not obtained a warrant of eviction under New York law.

The debtor has not appealed from the state court judgment of possession and asserts its time to do so has not expired because it has not received valid notice of entry.

The debtor did remove the state court action to the district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1452 and

proceedings to remand are pending in the district court.

Discussion. The principal issues for determination are, one, whether under Bankruptcy Code Section 362(b)(10) the debtor's lease terminated by expiration of the stated term of the lease before the commencement of the filing of the petition so as to preclude the debtor from obtaining stay relief automatically under the Bankruptcy Code in this court, and two, whether cause exists under Bankruptcy Code Section 362(d) to lift the automatic stay.

Expiration of the Lease. Section 362(b)(10) excludes from the protection of the automatic stay of Section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code "any act by a lessor to the debtor under a lease of nonresidential real property that is terminated by the expiration of the stated term of the lease before the commencement of or during a case under this title to obtain possession of such property." Whether a lease is terminated is to be resolved by referenced applicable nonbankruptcy state law. See In re: Policy Realty Corp., 242 B.R. 128 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). Landlord relies on In re: Policy Realty, arguing that the debtor's lease was terminated prior to the date of the petition by virtue of the debtor's defaults under the settlement and the passage of the ten-day notice period. Although In re: Policy Realty dealt with the question whether a lease terminated prepetition, there was no issue in that case of the tenant's right to appeal or otherwise seek

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review in the state court system. It is settled that the automatic stay remains in effect when the debtor has the opportunity to appeal a state court decision or otherwise seek review thereof. See In re: Stoltz, 197 F.3d 625, 630 (2d Cir. 1999) citing Robinson v. Chicago Housing Authority, 54 F.3d 316, 321 (7th Cir. 1995). See also P.J. Clarke's Restaurant Corp., 265 B.R. 392, 398-99 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 2001). landlord also relies on In re: Lady Liberty Tavern Corp., 94 B.R. 812 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) for the proposition that the tenant has no rights, but the landlord ignores the fact that the Court, while finding a state court decision on lease termination binding, left open the possibility that a motion to vacate the default judgment could be brought in state court and left that issue to be determined by the bankruptcy court on remand, 94 B.R. at 817, note 3.

In this case, the debtor has not appealed, but it appears from the record that its time to do so has not lapsed. Under New York law, "an appeal, as of right, must be taken within thirty days after service by a party upon the appellate of a copy of the judgment or order appealed from and written notice of its entry." See P.L.R. 5513(a). While the landlord purported to serve the debtor with notice of entry of the state court judgment of possession, it did so on May 1, 2001 after the debtor filed its Chapter 11 petition. It is well-settled that actions taken in violation of the stay are void and

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without effect. See E.G. Kalb v. Feuerstein 308 U.S. 433 (1940), In re: 48th Street Steakhouse, Inc., 835 F.2d 427 (2d Cir. 1987). The debtor has not yet been served with valid notice of entry of the state court judgment, and its time to appeal under New York law has not begun to run.

Although the debtor's time to appeal has not expired, at least as shown on this record, it is well-established that tenant's ability to stave off an eviction by virtue of a bankruptcy filing is not unlimited. The courts have held that the stay remains in effect to permit the debtor to permit the state court remedies -- to pursue its state court remedies, but only if "bona fide litigation is pending in the state court (or may with a reasonable likelihood of success be brought there)." In re: Eclair Bakery, 255 B.R. 121, 138 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.

In this case the tenant has made a sufficient showing of its ability as a consequence of what appears to be a serious contract to sell the lease to cure all arrears. Whether this is enough to obtain vacator of the judgment of possession is a matter for the state courts. The landlord insists that the debtor cannot cure because the debtor, here, breached a conditional limitation in the lease. It is unclear from the civil courts oral opinion exactly why the court held for the landlord, but it is clear that the state court didn't refer to conditional limitations, and in any event, the issue is one for

the state court system.

The landlord argues that all of the cases relating to stays after a bankruptcy filing are nonpayment rather than holdover proceedings and that there is a critical distinction. But this is not so. The eviction proceedings in P.J. Clarke's, which was my case, were commenced and prosecuted as a holdover for breach of a conditional limitation. The breach was nonpayment of rent, but the landlord there had cleverly made nonpayment of rent a breach of a conditional limitation, and therefore, was able to argue that it wiped out the tenant's rights by virtue of the tenant's failure to pay rent on its claim of the right of setoff. In any event, P.J. Clarke's contains a much more thorough discussion of these issues. I believe it to be directly on point and the parties are referred thereto.

The lease has apparently not terminated within the meaning of Section 365(b)(10) for the separate reason that the landlord did not obtain a warrant of eviction. It appears well-established under New York law that "a lease is not cancelled by the issuance of a notice of petition in a summary proceeding, nor even by the entry of a judgment therein, nor even by the execution of the warrant. It is the issuance of the warrant that effects the cancellation." See Rasch's "Landlord and Tenant including Summary Proceedings," Section 46: 18, 4th ed. (1998), internal citations omitted. See also

RPAPL Section 749(3), 105 Franklin Street Court v. Serotoff, 284 A.D. 262, 131 (N.Y.Sup. 2d 257), first department (1994) affirmed 308 N.Y. 1025, 127 N.E. 2d 865 (1995) where the court said, "The final order and summary proceedings does not terminate the relationship of landlord and tenant. And the point of termination occurs upon the issuance of the warrant which gives possession to the landlord." The landlord cites no authority under New York law for its proposition that the issuance of a warrant of eviction isn't irrelevancy in a holdover as opposed to a nonpayment case. Section 749(3) of the Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law relied on by the landlord does not distinguish between holdover and nonpayment proceedings. It provides, flatly, "The issuing of a warrant for the removal of a tenant cancels the agreement under which the person removed held the premises and annuls the relation of landlord and tenant, but nothing contained herein shall deprive the court of the power to vacate such warrant for good cause shown prior to the execution thereof." The landlord has not obtained a warrant of eviction, and thus the lease did not terminate, under New York law, before the filing of the petition for that additional reason.

Accordingly, the Court finds that the nonresidential real property lease is not "terminated by the extension of the stated term of the lease before the commencement of or during a case under this title" within the meaning of Section

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362(b)(10).

2. Relief from the Automatic Stay. Landlord moves for relief from the automatic stay pursuant to Sections 362(d)(1) and (2). Section (d)(2)(B) requires the landlord to show that the lease is not necessary for an effective reorganization. Since it appears to be the debtor's sole asset, the landlord cannot make the requisite showing at this stage of the case and has not attempted to do so. See In re: Sweet N Sour 7th Ave Corp., 2010 B.R. Lexis 1836 at *13 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y., June 18, 2010).

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay for cause. The debtor has paid postpetition rent or use and occupancy at the lease rent -- at the least rate. It has produced evidence of a contract to sell the lease to a third party for a sum that would permit cure of all defaults, payment of all unsecured debt, and a substantial return to equity. The landlord has not established that cause exists to terminate the automatic stay at this early stage of the case. See Id. In re: Sweet N Sour 7th Ave Corp.

Conclusion. Based on the foregoing, the landlord's motion for an order determining that the automatic stay does not apply and its motion for relief from the stay is denied. The debtor is directed to settle an appropriate order on three days' notice.

We should now establish a timetable for the debtor's

Page 19 motion to assume and assign the lease pursuant to the proposed 1 2 contract of sale. It is also incumbent on the debtor to commence appropriate proceedings to obtain relief under the state law. I do not know how the debtor can do that with the 4 5 case pending before Judge Gardephe, but I leave that to the 6 parties. So Mr. Rosenbloom, what do you want me to do with 7 regard to your motion -- I gather you have a motion to extend 8 time --9 10 MR. ROSENBLOOM: Correct. THE COURT: -- to assume or reject. That is pending 11 on what date? 12 13 MR. ROSENBLOOM: It's returnable, Your Honor, on the 19th at 11 a.m. 14 THE COURT: All right, and you really want a minimal 15 16 extension because --17 MR. ROSENBLOOM: Precisely. THE COURT: -- your deadline under the statute, your 18 19 three months are --20 MR. ROSENBLOOM: Yes. THE COURT: Well, your four months. When does --21 MR. ROSENBLOOM: Four months. 22 THE COURT: Four months expires --23 MR. ROSENBLOOM: On the 27th. 24 25 THE COURT: -- on the 27th. So let me suggest this.

I can hear you on the 19th. If you're coming back on the 30th or 31st --

MR. ROSENBLOOM: I believe it's the 31st. And in my motion, I specifically asked --

5 THE COURT: 31st.

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MR. ROSENBLOOM: -- that it be carried over until then.

THE COURT: The landlord -- obviously, counsel needs a chance to consult with its client. Landlord needs an opportunity to consider where things stand. The parties can, of course, agree to -- we're talking, Mr. Altman, about the four-month period under 365(d)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code that limits a debtor -- debtor's initial period of time to assume or reject a nonresidential real property lease to four months from the petition date. The Court can extend that time once for up to three months for cause shown. After that, the Court cannot extend the time. That was one of the statutory amendments that the landlords obtained in a recent amendment to the Bankruptcy Code. Parties can agree to put off the date so they don't have to come back multiple times. The parties can obviously, by written stipulation, even agree to put off the seven-month period. But that can only be done with the landlord's written consent. I don't want to have the parties have to come back here more times than they need to, but you can consider where you wish to go with regard to that hearing. Perhaps that

hearing would be useful in connection with the landlord's motion to assume and assign the lease.

Now, in order to assume and assign the lease under the Bankruptcy Code, the tenant has to show that the landlord has adequate assurance of future performance. One way of doing that is to show the financials of the proposed assignee, give the landlord an opportunity to examine into the issues relating to the assumption and to hold a hearing and a trial if necessary. Now, there is authority in the bankruptcy cases that with a warrant of eviction outstanding, the debtor doesn't have a sufficient interest in the lease to assume and assign it. I assume the parties can argue just as well that you really can't assume and assign it with a state court judgment outstanding, and I've said in my decision, you've got to go back to state court and get that judgment vacated if the landlord will agree to any resolution, here. It seems to me that I can proceed with the assumption and assignment proceedings here, subject to appropriate proceedings in the state court. The proceedings here could be held pending state court proceedings. Clearly, your contract, it would seem to me, would be relevant when you go back to the state court, and if you want a trial on whether or not the assignee is a reasonable tenant and the landlord would have adequate assurance of future performance, I'll give you one. If you want to come back the last week of August for any kind of a

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hearing, I'll be here. But most lawyers who have any sense take off sometime at the end of August, and I don't want to interfere with anybody's vacation because I happen to be here.

So I really -- I think, perhaps, what we should do is end the hearing today, give the parties an opportunity to consider where they are. We have a hearing on the 19th if we need one. If we don't, parties can agree to put everything off until, I guess it's the 30th. Perhaps we should have a pretrial on the 19th when the landlord -- if the landlord wants to go forward, or if the parties want -- or either party wants to go forward with the assumption and assignment proceedings, there may be issues relating to the information that the landlord -- that a landlord reasonably requests when considering an assignment or a sublet. I can't assume that the parties will agree on anything in this case. But I can always hope.

I realize that landlord/tenant relations are probably as bad as any, but very often, when parties get to bankruptcy court, they find a way to resolve things. I've said this before. I've even had spouses in bankruptcy court who have been fighting each other in state court for many, many years, and the husband -- usually the husband files a bankruptcy petition as a last ditch effort to hold off the spouse. When they get to bankruptcy court, sometimes people are able to bring things together but that's for them. So I guess our --

Page 23 at the moment, I'll just leave things with this being my 1 2 decision, and we have a hearing on the 19th if we need one. We need a -- parties want to turn that into a telephonic hearing 3 and save themselves -- at least save you a trip down from the 4 5 Bronx, I'm -- if the parties can agree, I'm certainly not going 6 to stand in the way. All right, thank you very much. I should also thank 7 both parties for excellent papers on this issue. 8 9 MR. ROSENBLOOM: Your Honor, I have -- we are prepared to share the bulk of our financials with the landlord. 10 would ask --11 THE COURT: Maybe that's a start. 12 13 MR. ROSENBLOOM: We would ask that the landlord, of course, sign a confidentiality agreement. 14 THE COURT: I don't think Mr. Altman can sign that for 15 16 his client. 17 MR. ROSENBLOOM: Precisely. I --THE COURT: And I'm sure he'll take it up with his 18 client. 19 20 MR. ROSENBLOOM: Precisely. 21 MR. ALTMAN: That's correct, yes. THE COURT: All right, thank you very much. 22 23 IN UNISON: Thank you, Your Honor. (Proceedings concluded at 3:26 PM) 24 25

Pg 24 of 25 Page 24 INDEX RULINGS Page Line Landlord's motion for an order determining that the automatic stay does not apply and its motion for relief from the stay is denied

Page 25 CERTIFICATION I, Dena Page, certify that the foregoing transcript is a true and accurate record of the proceedings. Dena Page Veritext 200 Old Country Road Suite 580 Mineola, NY 11501 Date: August 13, 2010